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PETER J. RABINOWITZ
On Teaching The Story of O.
Lateral Ethics and the Conditions of Reading
Actually, I’ve already raised some ethical issues by giving this essay a provocative but
misleading title. »Pauline Rage’s«1 pornographic classic The Story of O, written in
1954, is infamous as the story of a young fashion photographer who is brought by
her lover to a chateau; while there, she learns, through a series of increasingly brutal
encounters, to become (and enjoy being) a completely submissive object for male
pleasure. But as for »teachingThe Story of O«: I have never taught it, Iprobably never
would teach it, and in fact I’ve never even read it through in its entirety (I started it
and put it downmid-way, although not without skimming the rest and reading the
ending).2Upuntil now, I never thought aboutwhy I’dmade that choice – it seemed,
perhaps, so self-evident that it didn’t warrant serious exploration. But as I consid-
ered JLT’s generous invitation to contribute to this discussion, I thought itmight be
interesting to give that decision (or, more generally, some of the ethical tangles be-
hind that decision) amore serious examination.Why, in fact, don’t I teachThe Story
of O? Although I wasn’t fully conscious of them, in fact I had good reasons for my
decision – reasons thatmoveoff the usual axis of »literary studies and ethics« debates
onto what I’ll be calling »lateral ethics«. It’s those reasons I’d like to discuss here.
Let me open with a few primary starting points. First, I use the word »decision«
advisedly. There are lots of books (say,The GoldenHouse by Charles DudleyWarn-
er) that I’ve never taught, but that I never explicitly decided not to teach. The option
simply never came up, in most cases because I never knew the books existed. (For
the record, I hadn’t heard of The Golden House until I was halfway through com-
posing the previous sentence and decided to look for an example that suited my
purpose.)3 In the case of The Story of O, however, we’re dealing with a conscious
1 »Pauline Rage« was a pseudonym of Dominique Aury, although the actual authorship of the book
remained in question for many years after its publication in 1954.
2 Even when, years later, my son wrote his Bachelor’s Thesis on the novel (working – not coinci-
dentally, given the subject of the paper – with Wayne Booth and Lauren Berlant), I read his thesis
without returning to the novel.
3 I lighted on this book because I remembered that Warner had been a Hamilton College graduate –
and I was curious to see what he had written, other than The Gilded Age, a book he co-authored with
Mark Twain.
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choice, the result of an actual decision-making process. The Story of O, in other
words, is something I’ve considered and rejected.
Second, my decision is neither pragmatic (in the everyday sense), nor historical,
nor aesthetic. It has nothing to do with syllabus logistics (for instance, the number
of books I can fit into a semester), with availability, or with cost. It is not based on
my sense of its contribution to the history of the novel or of twentieth-century
thoughtmore generally. And it has nothing to dowithmy sense of the literary qual-
ity of the text, however that might be defined (in that sense, it’s not an »evaluation«
of the text, even though it’s surely a judgment).
Third, my decision is not based on anxiety about bringing X-rated subject mat-
ter into the classroom. I’ve taught other material that is as sexually explicit as The
Story of O – and conversations inmy classes often take turns that wouldmakemany
of my colleagues blush. Nearing the end of our three-hour discussion of the con-
clusion of TheCaptive inmyProust seminar last spring, for instance, one ofmy best
students, Megan Bolger, cried out, in reference to Albertine’s embarrassing verbal
slip, »What, we’re going to leave without talking about anal intercourse?«4 There
was laughter from the class, but it was a laughter of agreement: it was something
they expected and wanted to discuss.5 Whatever is governing my decision about
Story of O, it’s not prudishness.
Fourth, I’m convinced that my decision is not simply an inexplicable eccentric
choice, a quirk resulting from personal taste. Granted, The Story of O itself is prob-
ably not on many lists of »books considered and rejected«; but I believe that my
general manner of reasoning (if not the specific details) is implicitly shared by –
or would be useful for –many colleagues whowrestle with decisions about teaching
other similarly provocative novels, like Lolita or Gone with the Wind.
Most important in terms of this essay, while that general line of reasoning is eth-
ical at its base (no surprise, given the forum in which it appears), it does not, as I’ve
said, fit comfortably into the most familiar literature-and-ethics debates.6 It’s not
thatmy observations are especially radical, or even new – they’re not. But they often
get put to the side when literary theorists talk about ethics. In particular, while I am
offering a consequentialist argument, it does not focus on the potentially corrupt-
4 Thanks to Megan for her permission to quote her here.
5 Albertine starts to utter the phrase »me faire casser le pot« (French slang for anal intercourse), but
stops midway; it takes the narrator a while to reconstruct her utterance. He interprets this, curiously,
as a sign of her lesbianism – but figuring out what she meant and why he interprets it as he does is
important for understanding their relationship, and it’s something my students believed to be worth
talking about.
6 On the surface, perhaps, it would seem to overlap with discussions of censorship – for while deciding
not to teach a particular book is not censorship in the traditional sense, such decisions might cast
some doubt on the scope of Marshall Gregory’s generally unexceptional claim that »No ethical critic
supposes that censorship will even or ever work, much less that it will make people virtuous« (1998,
214). As we will see, though, I am more interested in the conditions of reading than in the act of
reading itself.
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ing effects that readingThe Story of O can have on the reader – at least, not in theway
that such consequences are usually conceived.
The most fundamental question in literature and ethics is probably whether we
should separate out the ethical when we make aesthetic judgments, a separation
vigorously defended by Richard Posner (1997, 1998). As a rhetorical narrative the-
orist – as someone whose inspiration lies in such works as Kenneth Burke’s »Psy-
chology and Form« andWayne Booth’sThe Rhetoric of Fiction and as someone who
has collaborated for decades with James Phelan – I share, not surprisingly,Marshall
Gregory’s position that we cannot separate the ethical from the aesthetic, no matter
howmuch ethical criticism ismaligned (Gregory 1998). That’s especially true if we
recognize, asGregory does, that political criticisms – feminist, post-colonial, and so
forth – »are not only linked to ethical views, but express views that are fundamen-
tally ethical to their core« (ibid., 200). Even apart from what Posner dismisses as
»moral content« (1997, 1), our experience of reading (and the rest of my argument
here will center on reading narrative fiction in particular, although it can be gen-
eralized beyond that) is so bound up with ethical choices that the notion of ethics-
free aesthetics – expressed, for instance, in Posner’s claim that »The proper criteria
for evaluating literature are aesthetic rather than ethical« (Posner 1997, 2, emphasis
added) – seems a contradiction. Even Proppian analysis, often held up as amodel of
pure, detached description, requires us to distinguish between heroes and villains.
But for the purposes of my argument here, I want to bracket the ethics/aesthetics
issue. Even if we could separate the aesthetic from the ethical, I’d make the same
choice, because my decision aboutThe Story of O is guided by a different set of con-
cerns.
My argument is grounded in two interlocking premises. First, ethics, for the most
part, involves acts and relationships among people (or, very rarely, between a person and
an object) in particular situations. Any discussion of ethics – and that includes any
discussion of narrative ethics – requires specifying who those people are and what
situation they find themselves in.
Second, reading is a social activity. Of course, my work has always stressed the
social component of interpretation – the authorial audience is a social, not an in-
dividual, entity; and the conventions of reading that allow us to interpret texts are
social in nature (see, for instance, Before Reading). But reading is social in another
way as well : that is, even beyond the act of interpretation, reading has a lateral di-
mension that involves groups of people in particular situations, groups with which
we have ethical relations that are only secondarily connected to the ethics of the
author-text-reader relationship.
Let me address this in a little more detail. DespiteWayne Booth’s arguments for
coduction (which includes discussionswith others) anddespite Tolstoy’s arguments
about the way that high art hardens class distinctions, narrative theorists (and I in-
clude myself here) often conveniently reduce the range of reading by equating it
with »interpreting« and treating it as a solitary activity inwhich »the reader« engages
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with a text created by an absent author. Seymour Chatman’s communication dia-
gram (1978, 151) stands as a familiar paradigm. Other critics, of course, have of-
fered elaborations or subtilizations of Chatman’s basic scheme (see, for instance,
Shaw 2005). More often than not, though, we still end up with variations on a
basic axis : a reader is connected by a text (whichmay be conceptualized as including
– besides characters – implied readers, authorial audience, narratees, narrative au-
dience, narrator, implied author, etc.) to an author.
Such schemas have proven invaluable, offering us excellent ways to conceptu-
alize a great deal of what is going on when we read. But their value comes, in
part, from their simplification: that is, treating reading as a solitary act allows us
to focus more clearly on the act of interpretation by ignoring other interfering fac-
tors. In particular, thismodel encourages us, to the extent thatwe consider the ethics
of a text, to center on the author’s ethical positions, the ethics of the characters and
situations represented, and (most important) the effects of all this on the readers.
Author-reader relationships, in other words, are emphasized. EvenBooth, for all his
concern for reading communities, is apt to slip into speaking of author and reader as
if they were the two »parties in every narrative exchange« (1988, 42). Certainly, this
scheme would provide ample grounds for exploring the ethical nature of my mis-
leading title.
As soon as we venture beyond the act of interpretation, however, we find our-
selves moving away from this clear line. That is, reading also involves a kind of lat-
eral ethics as we engage with other people as well, engagements that do not line up
on the same axis as the reader and the author. Let me mention just two complica-
tions that result.
First, although youmight never notice it inmost critical and theoretical texts (at
least those not directly andmore narrowly related to pedagogy or the study of read-
ing groups), people often read novels at least in part because they want to talk about
them: a key part of reading is sharing what you’ve read and creating or joining the
kind of community in which such sharing can take place.7 Thus, more often than not,
reading puts you in relationships with other readers or potential readers. These re-
lationships are not merely incidental to the act of reading in the way, say, that your
relationship to the other people standing in line at the Department of Motor Ve-
hicles is incidental to the act of renewing your driver’s license. Creation of those
reading relationships is, rather, one of the fundamental purposes of reading.
7 That motivation for reading may be even stronger with film these days than it is with novels. At the
closing ceremony of the 2010 Maine International Film Festival, for instance, Festival Director
Shannon Haines pointed to »bringing a community together to enjoy film« as a fundamental
purpose of the event – and I suspect that for most participants, the creation of community is as
important as the films themselves. That is, I doubt they’d attend with the same enthusiasm if they got
to watch precisely the same films in empty theaters. But it’s also one of the motivations behind book
groups, and often influences course selection as well : students maywell take a particular class because
they want to be part of a particular discussion with particular people.
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And they inevitably bring ethical entanglements that are different in kind from the
issues that are traditionally front-and-center in narrative-and-ethics discussions.
Take, for instance, the broadly shared rule requiring you to give fair warning of
spoilers, especially when you’re talking about films. How often does it come up
in discussion of Art and Ethics? It’s clearly an ethical rule: but it has nothing to
do with the three basic strands (the autonomy arguments, the triviality arguments,
and the consequentialist arguments) that Nol Carroll (2000) sees at the center of
current debates about art and ethical criticism.
Second, many of us read books at least partly in order to make public pro-
nouncements about them. As soon as you start writing, lecturing, and publishing
about narrative, you potentially take on the role of »critic«, someone who stands
apart from other readers because he/she wields (or claims towield) a certain author-
ity. Are all people who write about literature critics? Perhaps not. We can certainly
debate whether people who simply add comments to blogs are laying claim to au-
thority – my guess is that it depends on the person. But just about everyone who
writes »professionally« – whether writing movie reviews for theWaterville Morning
Sentinel or articles for JLT – does so with a certain presumption of authority. And
critical authority (or claims to it) brings into play yet another kind of ethical rela-
tion, one which also has little to do with what most of us narrative theorists talk
about when we talk about »narrative and ethics«.
As soon as you start teaching literature, both of these complications are brought
into play – with, of course, additional complications brought about by their inter-
action.
First, in a classroom, the group talking about the text often takes on a special
character. That is, in many classrooms (and I’d like to believe that my classrooms
are among them), whatever the »knowledge« conveyed (which can include general
principles of interpretation), part of the purpose of reading together is to create a
certain kind of community with particular virtues (which might include, for in-
stance, virtues as broad as inquisitiveness and as narrow as respect for Proust’s sen-
tence structure) and particular commitments (which might include, for instance,
agreement not to share the comments of others in the class outside the classroom).
Of course, any talk about books creates a community or communities, which may
have some of the same qualities: when you chat about the latest installment of Mad
Men at the lunch table, you and your friends may also be inquisitive and trusting.
But classrooms aremore intentional in this regard: that is, I suspect thatmost teach-
ers think more carefully about the community that will be created in their class-
rooms than about how their friends will respond to television gossip. And literature
classes often succeed or fail because of the nature of the community they create.
Second, the nature of the critic/teacher changes substantially as well, in two dis-
tinct ways. Critics, like authors more generally, write for authorial audiences,
whether that be the readership of the greater Waterville area or the presumed read-
ers of JLT.When you are teaching, in contrast, you’re in touch with an actual au-
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dience. Whatever your beliefs about our knowledge of the ways a narrative will
change the behavior of actual readers, it’s hard to argue that the aesthetic anti-con-
sequentialist argument (the belief that we can’t judge art on its effects, since those
effects are always unknowable) has its parallel with regard to teaching.8 If it did,
parents and students would have a substantial grievance. Furthermore, whereas
critics, for the most part, advise and comment, teachers have, in addition, a certain
limited power to require. A movie critic’s most enthusiastic endorsement (»You
must see this film!«) doesn’t carry the weight of a teacher’s (»You must finish
The Story of O before class on Wednesday!«).
Whenwe put all this together, it’s clear that teaching particular books involves us
and our students in ethical situations that narrative theorists (and, as I’ve said, I in-
cludemyself here) often circumvent, situations that shouldn’t be ignored if we take
literature, ethics, or teaching seriously. I don’t have specific conclusions about spe-
cific choices – that is, I don’t have a neat schema to tell people what books to include
on their syllabi. But this expansion of our thinking about ethics and literature does
have the potential change the terms of our discussions of literature and ethics.
So how does this reframing work out in practice? Let’s return to The Story of O.
Working along the familiar narratological axis, there are plenty of valuable and im-
portant interpretive questions. Here are just a few representative examples of the
sort that might well come up in an undergraduate discussion of the text. What,
for instance, is the implied author’s perception of sexuality and agency, of the re-
lationship of pain and pleasure?9 To what degree is the novel ironic – and what dif-
ference does that make on how we experience it or how we should experience it?
What are the presuppositions of the authorial audience or the ethical resonances
of experiencing, to use James Phelan’s term (1996, 90), the »progression« of the
novel? How does its complex publication history – which includes a variety of the-
ories about the novel’s authorship, prior to the final clarification in the 1990s – play
into issues of female subjectivity and agency?What’s the difference between reading
the novel now and reading the novel in the 1950s? Do different students read the
novel differently depending on age, sex, gender, or whatever?
These are all interesting, but they’re familiar sorts of questions among people
who talk about literature and ethics.Oncewemovebeyond the act of interpretation
to an account that deals with the lateral relationship introduced by taking the con-
ditions of reading into account, a different set of questions emerges. These ques-
tions –when considered at all by literary critics – seempart of a different discussion,
8 See, for instance, Carroll’s (2000) discussion, 355–57.
9 Of course, whenever we explore what Posner calls – with some disdain – the novel’s »moral content«
(1997, 1), we run the risk of reducing it to some sloganmasquerading as its »message«. That’s hardly a
necessary consequence, however, and there’s more interesting material here than Posner suggests.
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matters of pedagogy rather a central part of the theoretical literature and ethics de-
bate.10 Here are just two of them:
First, what’s the ethics of requiring someone to read the text? Someone like Pos-
ner might want to claim that this is not really a matter of »ethics and literary stud-
ies«, but amatter of ethics and pedagogy. That, however, would be a copout, since at
least some of the ethical issues arise from the »literary« qualities of the text in ques-
tion. That is, you can’t possibly talk about the ethical differences between assigning
The Story of O and assigning Pride and Prejudice without talking about the differ-
ences between those texts as texts – but the nature of those differences take on a
different light in an atmosphere of compulsion, especially when dealing (as I
do) with 18-to-22-year-olds. In any case, assigning a novel signals to my students
that, at the very least, I consider it to be worthwhile. Thus, even if I taughtThe Story
of O in the context of a discussion of theory and pornography where I severely criti-
cized it, my decision to place it on the syllabus would implicitly affirm my belief
that there was something useful gained from the experience of reading it. If a stu-
dent felt debased or battered or seriously destabilized by the text, I would be im-
plicated in those feelings – and at the very least, I would have an ethical obligation
to justify the negative experience. Now in fact I teach many books that unsettle,
even batter my students, in one way or another: Anthony Burgess’s Clockwork Or-
ange, Richard Wright’s Uncle Tom’s Children, Nawal El Saadawi’s God Dies by the
Nile. I encourage my students to confront issues of suicide directly, whether it
be through discussing the failed suicide of Marcel’s grandmother in In Search of
Lost Time or talking about Jean Morris’s desire for death in Salih’s Season of Migra-
tion to theNorth. I do so in the belief, though, that by the end of class discussion,my
studentswill agree that the reading experiencewasworth it. But Imaywell bewrong
here; and if challenged by a student who feels assaulted by having to read the rape
scenes in Clockwork Orange, I won’t be able to justify my choice simply by arguing,
say, that the authorial audience of Clockwork Orange needs to have those ex ACHTUNGTRENNUNGpe-
ACHTUNGTRENNUNGriences in order to appreciate the moral argument of the text. Somehow, my re-
sponse will have to go beyond the relationship between the reader, text, and author
and includemy student’s lateral relationship tome (and the institution I represent).
Second, what’s the ethical effect of requiringmy students to read the novel in this
particular group?What are the potential costs, for instance, of deliberately creating a
situation wheremy female students have towonder whether themen sitting next to
them have gotten some kind of sexual frisson from the novel’s potentially attractive
descriptions of female masochism?What are the potential costs of deliberately cre-
ating a situation where my male students have at least to consider looking at their
female classmates through the prism of that text – or a situation where they have to
wonder what the female students are wondering about their (the males’) reactions
10 See, for instance, Patnoe’s excellent article on Lolita, which touches on some of these issues, but does
not use the word »ethics« at all.
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to the book?11Many factors may be relevant here. Does it matter whether the class-
room is co-ed or single sex?Whether the book is taught by amale or a female teach-
er? And so on. Significantly, what does notmatter verymuch is the implied author’s
»ethical position« or even the ethical experience of the text’s progression (see Car-
roll’s discussion of the difference between »knowledge that« and »knowledge of«,
2000, 362). It doesn’t matter very much whether Rage is endorsing female sub-
mission or undermining it or joking about it or offering a more complicated ironic
view. Nor is the novel’s persuasiveness relevant. A student’s lateral relationship to
the other students in the class has been altered regardless of how they, individually
or as a group, take up the challenge.
Of course, such wondering about what your fellow students are thinking is pos-
sible in any class – or at any lunch table. But once it’s generated by a required class
reading, it takes on an increased immediacy and an increased gravity, and has a dif-
ferent impact on the nature of the community.
Given my pedagogical aims, which include trying to create an environment
where students can be honest and open as they discuss serious and controversial
issues, I think that – regardless of the ethical tangles of the reader-text-author re-
lationships – including this book onmy syllabus would create lateral ethical effects
that would be counter-productive. But the purpose of this essay is not really to de-
fend my decision to reject The Story of O for class nor to defend my decisions with
respect to Lolita and Gone with the Wind (both of which I’ve taught – although
never near the beginning of a semester, before the class community had begun
to develop a certain measure of trust). In fact, I suspect that my observations
here might help someone argue against my decisions about Lolita and Gone with
the Wind. In the former case, for instance, I always give students the opportunity
to opt out of that part of the class. No one has ever taken me up on it, but is that
surprising?Wouldn’t taking advantage of that option injure your relationship to the
rest of the class? I’ve never taughtGone with theWind to a class with African-Amer-
ican students – is it possible that I’m somehow creating divisions between my stu-
dents and their out-of-class friends?
These are all legitimate questions – but we can only begin to answer them ef-
fectively once we reframe the more general terms of our discussions of narrative
ethics.
Peter J. Rabinowitz
Comparative Literature Department
Hamilton College
11 Alice Walker’s short story ›Porn‹ deals explicitly with the ways in which even consensually shared
pornography can distort a relationship.
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Thanks toCorinneBancroft, KathrynDoran,Nancy Rabinowitz, andEmilyRohrbach
for their advice and commentary as I worked on this essay.
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